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W

hat happens when two
lutions to reduce emissions, it seems that the board,
giants, climate change and
along with many of California’s leaders, prefers a capthe Constitution, come into
and-trade program over other alternatives.
conflict? California is a major
It is easy to characterize AB 32 as a logical procase in point. Global warmgression of California’s past actions related to climate
ing holds the potential to
change. The legislature has previously passed pioneerbecome the single greatest
ing legislation that attempts to regulate GHG emisenvironmental problem facing the world communisions from its automobile fleet.4 Additionally, about
two months before signing AB 32, Schwarzenegger
ty. A growing number of states are taking unilateral
signed an agreement with Prime Minister Tony Blair
actions to counter this threat. In its traditional posiproviding for the state and the United Kingdom to
tion, California is playing a leadership role. But the
work cooperatively to address climate change.5
Constitution restricts the power of states to address
The governor has issued an executive order that
certain problems and particularly limits the stratesets out an aggressive timeline for California to regies states can employ to further the interests of their
duce its GHG emissions.6 The state’s bureaucracy
citizens. Are California’s vanguard policies constituhas taken some steps to address the issue: the Calitionally legitimate?
fornia Public Utility Commission has instituted a
The threat of climate change does not hinge on
process to cap GHG emissions for electricity genwhere GHG emissions occur. On the contrary, beerators.7 California has also
cause these gases quickly asgone to great lengths to invest
similate into the global atmoin research to help the state
sphere, emissions in Florence,
understand the stakes it has in
Italy, have the same global imthe climate change debate and
pact as those released in Florthe policies it could pursue to
ence, California. Yet, even as
address the problem.8
the problem of climate change
Perhaps due to the stark
is a global one, its solutions
contrast between California
are often inherently local. It
and the dearth of federal acis only through cumulative
tion on climate change, AB
efforts of many that we have
32 has attracted the spotlight
any hope of addressing the
of the international stage. As
problem.
Schwarzenegger signed the
California has placed itself
legislation, national and interon the leading edge of statenational leaders showed their
level climate change action.
support and praised AB 32.
Most significantly, in SepWhat happens when two giants,
Blair noted that the signing certember 2006, Governor Arclimate change and the Constitution,
emony represented a “historic
nold Schwarzenegger signed
come into conflict?
day for the rest of the world as
into law California’s Global
well.”9 Indeed, the backdrop for the signing ceremony
Warming Solutions Act, AB 32.1 AB 32 requires the
California Air Resources Board to set limits to re— more than 100 flags of the world’s nations — highduce the state’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the
lights the global fanfare surrounding AB 32.
year 2020.2 This law represents the nation’s first manGiven California’s role as a state, extraordinary cirdate to reduce GHG emissions across a state’s entire
cumstances surround AB 32. Outside of the media’s
economy. The act does not specify how the board
spotlight, it is easy to imagine that many others have
should go about reducing emissions, but instead
wondered how AB 32 might impact them. Presumgenerally states that the board will adopt regulations
ably the shadow of the act has created discomfort for
“to achieve the maximum technologically feasible
the president and others in Washington, D.C., who
and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission reduchave advocated only modest and voluntary action to
tions” possible.3 In considering different options, it
address climate change. Indeed, comments such as
seems likely that the board will eventually promote
Schwarzenegger’s criticism of the federal government
a cap-and-trade program. Although the act does not
rang out loud and clear in the press: “California will
directly call upon the board to use market-based sonot wait for our federal government to take strong
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action on global warming.”10 Those charged with
negotiating our nation’s treaties may have wondered
if California’s actions complicated the U.S. position.
Additionally, those inside and outside the state who
rely on the bounty of the California economy had
to wonder whether they would help bear the cost of
AB 32.
Because both the benefits and the costs of California’s actions at least have the potential to extend
beyond state lines, it should not be surprising that its
actions raise some serious questions about whether
the state has overstepped or will overstep its bounds.
Depending on how the board implements AB 32,
California’s enactment may raise constitutional concerns, particularly if it settles on a cap-and-trade system that impacts interstate commerce or attempts to
broaden the relevant GHG market by coordinating
the state’s GHG markets with those
Because benefits and created in other countries.
This article is meant to provide
costs of California’s California with some sound advice
actions extend
on the extent to which potential fedbeyond state lines, eral constitutional pitfalls surround
questions arise as to the state’s action. We also understand
that a growing number of states are
their propriety
on track to follow California’s steps.
Given this, we highlight the fact that
the analysis contained in this article has practical
value for those outside the state.

The Problem of Leakage and the
Dormant Commerce Clause

D

espite the simplicity of the goal, the
state faces some significant challenges
in creating an effective cap-and-trade
system. One such barrier is that those
outside California might undo any
progress California makes inside its borders. In
confronting a global problem, the fluid nature of
the global economy can make it difficult to achieve
and assess progress.
In order to ensure that any reductions within
California translate to actual reductions of GHGs
in the global atmosphere, the state’s implementing
agencies will need to design a program that takes
precautions to guarantee that gains from such reductions are not lost through GHG increases elsewhere. The danger in proceeding with indifference
to such leakage is that it could undermine California’s goals.
Leakage is a common challenge for policies attempting to reduce undesirable activities. For example,
when a municipal police force institutes an aggressive
attack on illegal drug sales, drug sellers may relocate to
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other jurisdictions and continue their illegal business.
Within the electricity sector, relocating generating facilities to escape global warming regulation is implausible, at least in the short term, but the
electrical grid and the interchangeable
Leakage is a
nature of generated electricity means
common challenge
the market may respond by shifting
for policies
production to unregulated facilities
outside the state. The risk of leakage
attempting to
grows out of several factors including reduce undesirable
transportation costs, the pollution inactivities
tensity of the product, the ability of
out-of-state producers to create similar
products, the regulatory burden outside California,
and the capacity of out-of-state producers to fill California reductions.
The term leakage can have unfortunate connotations. While it captures the concern that efforts
within California may be undone by the response
of the broader economy, it can also suggest that
California will attempt to reach out beyond its borders to target troublemakers outside of the state.
Instead, anti-leakage measures should be thought
of as devices to plug holes in California’s regulatory
program to prevent the benefits of that program
from dissipating. So long as these measures are applied evenhandedly and without discriminatory effects on economic activity outside the state, they
are appropriate measures for it to enact. The more
that California looks outward or aims its program
at outsiders, the more likely it is that the dormant
Commerce Clause will cause problems.

The Problem of Leakage in the Electricity Sector
Of all the sectors that a cap-and-trade program will
likely cover, the utility industry faces the greatest
challenges in curbing leakage. Transmission lines
make transporting electricity simple and inexpensive and electrons on the grid are indistinguishable from each other. California already purchases
about one-quarter of its electricity from outside its
borders. Because its in-state electricity production
facilities largely rely on sources of power other
than coal and gas, the imported power accounts
for one-half of the GHG emissions attributable
to California’s electricity use.11 Meanwhile, many
out-of-state generators have excess capacity. If the
state increasingly comes to rely on electricity produced outside of California, total GHG emissions
for electricity used by Californians most likely will
increase.
In evaluating California’s cap-and-trade program
with the dormant Commerce Clause in mind, the
constitutionality of any government action that
implicates interstate commerce will in large part
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turn on its objectives and whether the provisions of
California’s cap-and-trade program can be defended as an effective and non-discriminatory means of
achieving those objectives. The state’s basic objectives for the program were defined by the California
Legislature in AB 32:
The Legislature finds and declares all of the
following:
(a) Global warming poses a serious threat to
the economic well-being, public health, natural
resources, and the environment of California.
The potential adverse impacts of global warming
include the exacerbation of air quality problems,
a reduction in . . . the Sierra snowpack, a rise in
sea levels . . . , damage to marine ecosystems and
the natural environment, and an increase in . . .
human health-related problems.
(b) Global warming will have detrimental
effects on some of California’s largest industries. . . . It will also increase the strain on electricity supplies. . . .
(c) California has long been a national and
international leader on energy conservation and
environmental stewardship efforts. . . . The program established by this division will continue
this tradition. . . .
(d) National and international actions are
necessary to fully address the issue of global
warming. However, action taken by California
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases will have
far-reaching effects . . . .
(e) By exercising a global leadership role,
California will also position its economy . . . to
benefit from . . . efforts to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases . . . and will provide an opportunity for the state to take a . . . leadership role in
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.12
These goals contrast starkly with the major concern behind the dormant Commerce Clause, which
is to prevent economic protectionism. Rather than
protecting its internal economy, California aims
to lead the way in taking actions that will help the
world reduce the threat of climate change.
To understand why the state is justified in worrying about leakage, it is useful to think about how
leakage implicates its stated purposes in enacting
AB 32. Put into the context of energy production
and consumption, California’s purposes boil down
to three recurring themes:
• Taking responsibility for emissions caused by
the energy it produces and consumes;
• Reducing externalities related to its production and consumption of energy; and

• Showing leadership as an environmental steward.
Leakage directly undermines all three of these
objectives. California wants to take responsibility
for the emissions that constitute its global warming
footprint; leakage undermines that goal. Similarly,
leakage undercuts the objective of reducing the
externalities associated with its consumption and
production of electricity; displacing its emissions
with emissions outside the state leaves the global
warming problem unaffected — or worsened. Finally, it is hard for California to show environmental leadership if leakages make the state’s regulatory
structure ineffective.
The Constitution limits how California may go
about negating the adverse effects of leakage. Just as a
police chief cannot investigate and arrest drug dealers
who have moved out of the chief ’s municipality and
started up business somewhere else,
states face limits in what they can
The Constitution
do to minimize the adverse effects of
limits how
leakage. So long as the cap-and-trade
California may go
program places legal responsibilities
on entities that remain in Califor- about negating the
nia or on sales of electricity to users
adverse effects of
in California, and so long as it does
leakage
not place burdens on the entities or
transactions that differ according to
whether the electricity involved was generated inside
or outside the state, its efforts ought to be sustained.

The Dormant Commerce Clause
Under the Constitution, the Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce. The dormant
Commerce Clause is an unwritten logical extension of Congress’s power that prevents states from
usurping Congress’s authority to regulate interstate
commerce.
At the heart of the dormant Commerce Clause is
the principle that states are not allowed to discriminate against citizens of other states “simply to give
a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.”13
The concern that states had erected trade barriers
among them
reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that
was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in
order to succeed, the new union would have
to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the
colonies and later among the [s]tates under the
Articles of Confederation.14
Undoubtedly, the free flow of commerce among the
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states is one of the chief aspects of U.S. economic
strength.
In reviewing dormant Commerce Clause challenges, courts first look to whether the law discriminates against out-of-staters or attempts to regulate
beyond a state’s jurisdiction. If a law does either of
these, courts apply a strict scrutiny standard which
is extremely difficult for a state to satisfy.15 If a law
regulates evenhandedly and only attempts to regulate within its borders, it still receives dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny, but the courts apply a
balancing test that is much more favorable to the
state law.16
If a state law receives strict scrutiny, it is subject
to a “virtually per se rule of invalidity.”17 Few laws
— exactly one, in fact — have survived the strict
scrutiny that the Court applies to discriminatory
laws. Under the balancing test that courts apply to
evenhanded laws — sometimes called the Pike balancing test — laws have much greater chances for
success. In all cases, courts examine the terms of the
law, the information before the state when it made
the law, and the real-world impact of the law.
The first-order question for dormant Commerce Clause analysis is what level of scrutiny a
court should apply. In order to ferret out a law that
burdens interstate commerce, courts first look to
whether a state regulation is discriminatory.
Discriminatory laws fall into two categories.
Facially discriminatory laws are those that differentiate between in-state and out-of-state entities in
terms of the laws themselves. Facially neutral laws
do not draw a distinction in terms of the law between in-state and out-of-state entities, but they are
found to be discriminatory either because of their
effects or their purposes.18
If a law is facially neutral, a court
Few laws — exactly will review a law based on its impacts
one, in fact —
on interstate commerce.19 Whether
a court deems a facially neutral state
survive the strict
law discriminatory or neutral in apscrutiny that the
plication largely depends on how the
Court applies to
court characterizes the law’s applicadiscriminatory laws tion. Here, courts focus primarily on
the law’s practical effect, although a
discriminatory purpose can also subject a law to
strict scrutiny.20 If a facially neutral law does not
create barriers to trade, prohibit the flow or increase
the costs of interstate commerce, or distinguish between in-staters and out-of-staters, courts will find
a law nondiscriminatory.21
Although strict scrutiny is usually reserved for
discriminatory laws, there is also the special case of
laws that attempt to “control conduct beyond the
boundary of the state,” or extraterritorial legislaPage 54
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tion.22 Again, courts will look to see if a law explicitly is extraterritorial or has the “practical effect” of
being extraterritorial. In evaluating whether a law
has the practical effect of regulating conduct beyond
state boundaries, courts consider the consequences
of the law, how the challenged law interacts with
other states’ regulations, and what would happen
if many or all states adopted similar legislation.23
After weighing these specific considerations, if the
court finds that a state regulation would produce
“inconsistent legislation,” it will apply strict scrutiny and consistently strike down such laws.24
Once a court determines that it should apply
strict scrutiny, what does this mean? As a practical
matter, it means that the state will almost certainly
lose. The Court has upheld only one state law that
was deemed to be a discriminatory state law25 and
no state law that attempts to control conduct beyond the state’s boundaries.
From a more doctrinal perspective, in order to
uphold a discriminatory or extraterritorial law,
courts conduct a two-pronged inquiry: first, to find
that the law has a legitimate and substantial purpose and, second, to find that there are no less discriminatory means of accomplishing that purpose.
While courts look critically at both prongs, the burden of showing that there are no less discriminatory
means is an especially heavy one.26 If a court finds
that there is any potentially less discriminatory way
for a state to accomplish its purposes, the statute
fails.27 Litigants and courts have proven to be very
capable of finding less discriminatory means.28 As
Justice Thurgood Marshall famously explained in
another context: “Strict scrutiny is strict in theory
but fatal in fact.”29 While that aphorism has not
held true in the context of equal protection jurisprudence,30 it remains true in the context of the
dormant Commerce Clause.
When a state law is not discriminatory or extraterritorial, courts apply the Pike balancing test.
The Supreme Court articulated the standard for
a balancing test for dormant Commerce Clause
challenges in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.31: “Where
the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.”32
The Pike test requires courts to make a number
of relatively subjective evaluations: whether the
claimed local interest is “legitimate”; whether any
“less burdensome” regulatory alternatives are available; and, ultimately, whether the alleged benefits
of the regulation outweigh the burdens on inter-
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state commerce.33 Because of the subjective nature
of this test, the outcome is often difficult to predict.34
The Supreme Court has found that protecting
the business reputation of in-state producers is a
fairly insignificant interest.35 In contrast, the Court
has found a wide range of purposes to be legitimate,
including public safety,36 consumer protection,37 resource conservation, and environmental quality.38
While courts have found many purposes legitimate,
some interests may receive more weight than others. For example, while the Supreme Court has recognized environmental protection as a legitimate
local interest, it has done so on limited occasions
and seems to prefer such interests be articulated in
terms of public safety. This may particularly be the
case with the current makeup of the
Supreme Court.
Four dissenting
In the Supreme Court’s recent
justices would have environmental decision Massachuheld that the state setts v. EPA,39 four dissenting juschallengers did not tices would have held that the state
challengers did not have standing
have standing to sue to sue over harm caused by climate
over climate change change40 and would have allowed the
Environmental Protection Agency
to reject GHGs as pollutants under the Clean Air
Act.41 Similarly, in Rapanos v. United States,42 the
same four justices dissented and read the Clean Water Act in a way that would have sharply limited
the reach of the act. Taken together, these cases suggest the wisdom of framing the threats of climate
change more broadly than environmental problems. Indeed, this is what the California legislature
did in laying out its purposes for enacting AB 32.
While we suggest that states should cast a fairly
wide net in framing their purpose, they need to understand that overstating the case may prove harmful in the course of litigation. One reason for this
is that it is critical that a state build a robust record
justifying its purposes for action. Hollow reasons
for action will make it difficult to build an adequate
record. States should take time to draw a clear relationship between the state regulation and the harm
it seeks to prevent. Additionally, it hurts states to
concoct rationales out of thin air, because in parsing a state’s purpose, courts are often skeptical about
its purported interests, because enumerated reasons
may actually be merely dressed up rationales that
cloak economic protectionism. Our assessment
is that the given purposes for enacting AB 32 are
substantial and justifiable rationales for regulatory
action. California should attempt to back up these
rationales with an administrative record that shows
a clear connection between the regulatory measures

it chooses and the purposes set forth by the legislature.
We can apply these dormant Commerce Clause
principles to the leakage issue. If California aims to
stop leakage by treating electricity generated outside
of the state differently than electricity generated inside its borders, the state will almost certainly lose
when facing a lawsuit based on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds. This means that California should
avoid making regulatory distinctions between instate energy and out-of-state energy and create a
process that is blind to the location of energy production. Similarly, if California attempts to stop
leakage by attempting to regulate outside of California, the state will likely lose. This means that the
incidence of regulation — the events upon which
regulatory requirements are imposed — ought to
be easily describable as occurring within California.
For example, the state might be tempted to require
those generating energy to install costly equipment
to monitor emissions. Imposing this burden outside
of the state might invite the argument that California is regulating beyond its boundaries. In contrast,
California might require that anyone selling electricity in the state of California be able to provide
assurance that certain GHG-related standards are
being met. Such assurance might be provided by
continuous emissions monitors, but these would
not have been directly mandated.
Given the stringency of the strict
California’s only
scrutiny test, California’s only vioption
is to create
able option is to regulate in such a
laws that do not
way that courts will apply the Pike
balancing test, or in other words, to
discriminate or
create laws that do not discriminate
have extraor have extraterritorial effects.
territorial
effects
With regard to the first component of the Pike balancing test, a
reviewing court will evaluate California’s legitimate
interests in enacting a GHG cap-and-trade program. The state’s interests as well as how those interests are served by the measures it is taking should
be substantiated by a record of evidence. Assuming
that California builds a proper record to support
its decision, a reviewing court should find that its
interests are substantial. However, California can
help a potential reviewing court see the policy in its
most favorable light. To do so, the state will want to
highlight those factors that receive greater recognition from reviewing courts.
With the justifications California has already
laid out in AB 32,43 the state has started out on
the right foot. In moving forward, we suggest that
California keep four principles in mind when crafting its regulations.
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First, it should create a process and rationale
for action that focuses on regulating California.
Not only should the state document its desire to
regulate its own internal consumption and production of GHGs, its actions should back this up. This
means finding ways to run its program — including its attempt to control leakage — that focus on
actors operating within the state.
Second, California should identify and stress the
benefits that accrue specifically to the state. Even
though California is attempting to lessen the impact of a global problem, its strongest justification
for taking state action is that this global problem
has severe localized impacts. California’s record
should explain how the actions that it takes are
aimed at helping the state and should describe the
local factors at risk. Again, the groundwork for this
approach is already in place in the legislative purposes found in AB 32.44
In a related vein, California should anticipate
the argument that its efforts are futile. In other
words, opponents in litigation might argue that regardless of what California does, it will suffer the
harm it seeks to avoid. In passing AB 32, California has emphasized its desire to show environmental leadership.45 Its desire to inspire others to act
is important. The state should also make the case
that the only way to solve international problems is
for many to do their part. If every government had
to wait for the world to agree before taking action,
nothing would be done. California’s efforts to reduce the challenge make others more likely to act.
Third, California needs to take special pains to
avoid even the appearance that its program is motivated by punishing out-of-staters. While we have
no reason to anticipate that this would be any part
of its motives, the record ought to
reflect clearly that California is soleCalifornia needs
ly interested in taking responsibility
to avoid even the
for its share of the global warming
problem, and not out of any desire
appearance that
to go after out-of-state bad guys. If
it is motivated by
such motivation became an imporpunishing out-oftant element in its decision, even if
staters
only because rhetorically it is a way
to generate in-state support, this will
put the state on much less solid ground.
Fourth, in crafting its policy, California should
avoid indicting the federal government for its lack
of action. It should take care not to frame its efforts
as an attempt to override federal policies on GHG
regulation.46 While California can legitimately note
that it is dissatisfied with national policies, it needs
to walk a fine line so that it does not appear that the
overriding motivation for the state’s action is to put
Page 56
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a stick in the eye of the federal government.
With regard to the second prong of the Pike balancing test, a reviewing court will weigh California’s benefit against the burden its policies place on
interstate commerce. Again, California can assist
itself by intelligently designing its regulatory system. While it is impossible to assess the burden of
an unknown program, we do wish to provide two
benchmarks that would lessen the impact on the
interstate economy.
One benchmark policymakers should keep in
mind is the more squarely that California can place
the regulatory burden on in-state actors the better.
For example, it could place its burden on loadserving entities that transport electricity within the
state, utilities that generate or sell electricity within
the state, or consumers that consume within the
state. Of course, in making its decision, California
will want to reduce leakage, and it will somehow
need to track both the energy produced outside the
state but sold in California along with the electricity produced in the state but exported elsewhere.
The second benchmark is that the simpler California makes it for out-of-staters to comply with
the state’s regulations, the better. The more burdensome the regulation, the more likely it is that a
court will find that the state fails the Pike balancing
test. This is important enough that it is not unreasonable for the state to seriously consider making
small concessions of the program’s effectiveness in
order to accommodate this goal. Similarly, California will want to make sure that its policy will place
out-of-staters that want to participate in California’s
market on equal footing with in-staters. The theme
should be that out-of-staters are only asked to do
their fair share and that the burdens and processes
that they encounter are no different from those of
in-state producers.
In sum, we think that California’s legislation will
survive a legal challenge under the dormant Commerce Clause if it avoids strict scrutiny, attaches
regulatory obligations on events that can readily be
described as in-state activities, and compiles a record documenting the effectiveness of its regulatory
measures in accomplishing the state’s legitimate
objectives. That said, California can do much to
help its cause in the instance that a reviewing court
weighs its regulation under the Pike balancing test.
Climate change looms large in California’s future,
as it does for the entire world. To build a strong
record, the state needs to tie its actions to, and explain its policies in light of, those threats. Additionally, it should avoid vilifying out-of-state interests
or the federal government. Additionally, the state
will help its cause if it makes it easy to comply with
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its regulations and takes pains to assure that outof-staters do not have different burdens or have to
comply with different processes than those required
of in-staters.

Emissions Trading and the Dormant
Foreign Policy Power

C

alifornia needs to remain aware of another federal constitutional matter. The
state has taken steps to initiate linkages
between its own future cap-and-trade
program and trading systems of foreign
governments, which may implicate the Constitution’s dormant foreign relations power, a legal principle which holds that the federal government is
the ultimate authority with respect to U.S. foreign
policy. Even though the federal government has declined to take action against global warming explicitly, California may still be precluded from taking
such action on its own because an
agreement between California and
An agreement
foreign nations arguably undermines
between California the nation’s foreign policy.
and foreign
Under the 2006 agreement making
California and the United Kingnations arguably
dom
partners in the war against globundermines foreign
al warming, the two will share best
policy
practices on market-based systems
and jointly investigate new technologies. The agreement has been heralded as a beachhead for those who hope to reduce GHGs and as
a first step toward linking California’s market with
the EU. Additionally, just this year, Schwarzenegger has entered into similar agreements with the
state of Victoria in Australia, as well as the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, and
Ontario.
In all the fanfare, the legal implications of such
international connections have received little attention. In particular, the question remains whether
the Constitution would even allow California to
enter into an agreement with another foreign nation.

Extra-Jurisdictional Trading
As California considers adopting a cap-and-trade
program, it will have to consider whether the system will issue credits for offsets made outside of the
state. In considering this question, it will likely have
to balance the purposes of its program. On one
hand, allowing extra-jurisdictional offsets provides
opportunities for California to lower the cost of reducing emissions; larger markets generally increase
diversity, which would lead to increased reductions

and a more economically efficient program. On the
other hand, extra-jurisdictional offsets reduce the
incentives for California to reform its own dependence on fossil fuels. Extra-jurisdictional offsets are
also more difficult to monitor effectively, which decreases certainty that claimed reductions are actual
reductions.
Particularly in light of concerns regarding monitoring, California may consider limiting offsets to
other states and even foreign governments that have
reliable GHG markets in place. For example, California could limit its program to those states that
have joined with California — at least in principle
— to create the Western Regional Climate Action
Initiative or perhaps expand its reach to the several northeastern and mid-Atlantic states that currently are developing a regional strategy to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions, a program known as the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. If California
could allow entities in its program to trade with
other states, this larger domestic market could benefit both California and the other states by providing more opportunities for low-cost reductions and
more stability in trading markets.
California may also decide to look outside of the
United States. International cooperation to reduce
GHG emissions has already begun to take place.
In 1992, 180 countries signed the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.47 Negotiations under the climate convention led to the Kyoto Protocol,
which entered into force in 2005. It The state can limit
offsets to other
requires member nations to achieve
an averaged 5.2 percent reduction in
states and foreign
1990 GHG levels by 2012.48 In orgovernments that
der to meet these requirements, the
have reliable
EU has recently initiated the largest
markets in place
GHG trading market in the world,
the Emissions Trading Scheme, covering 25 countries and 6 major industrial sectors.49
California may find great program savings if it
honored offsets in the ETS market (beyond that required by Kyoto) to count toward California’s program. Furthermore, the agreement by Schwarzenegger and Blair and those signed with other jurisdictions subsequently hint that California is seriously
considering a market-based cap-and-trade program
to reduce GHGs, which could potentially be linked
to the ETS or to other carbon markets outside the
United States.50
At this point, it is only speculation whether the
ETS or other foreign carbon markets would incorporate outside actors — particularly those governments that are part of a nation that has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, such as a U.S. state. The
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ETS, however, does allow members to participate
in international emissions trading with any party
included in Annex B of the Protocol.51 Annex B
includes the United States, so the EU could potentially link with individual U.S. states as subsidiaries
of an Annex B nation.52 Again, it is at least plausible
that California and the EU nations could benefit
from such an international partnership.53

The Dormant Foreign Relations Power
If the California Air Resources Board decides to
adopt a cap-and-trade program to reduce GHGs
that is linked to the ETS or some other foreign
carbon market, there might be significant legal implications. In Article I, the Constitution provides
Congress the power to “regulate commerce with
foreign nations.”54 The Court has read that to mean
that the federal government has
authority to conduct foreign relaIf California adopts tions.55 Furthermore, the president
a cap-and-trade
has extensive foreign relations powers56 and speaks with the country’s
program linked
57
to the EU trading supreme voice on foreign policy.
The president also has the authority
system, there might to enter into treaties with the advice
be legal implications and consent of the Senate.58
All this is not to say that a state
government does not have any way to engage in
agreements with international partners or to conduct business with firms from other nations. Rather,
it means that a state cannot interfere with the federal government’s ability to create foreign policy —
in other words, federal statutes dealing with foreign
affairs, international treaties, and federal executive
agreements preempt state regulations that interfere
with them.59
Article VI states that federal law, including treaties, is the “supreme law of the land.”60 State laws
that conflict with federal action must yield to federal power. The preemption of state laws can be either express or implied. Express preemption occurs
when a federal statute explicitly says a state may not
pass a law addressing a particular issue. Alternatively, implied preemption can occur in three different ways. First, a state statute can be preempted
if it invades a field of federal law that is “so pervasive”61 that there is no room for state regulation.
This is called “field preemption.”62 Second, a state
statute that is in direct conflict with federal law is
preempted.63 Finally, a state statute that “stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”64
can also be preempted.
At times, the Court has interpreted the field of
foreign policy to be so broad that some state statPage 58
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utes which conflict with federal diplomacy have
been deemed preempted without contradicting
specific foreign agreements — the dormant foreign
relations power.65 While the Court has employed it
sparsely, this broad power has been used to preempt
state laws even if there is not an express treaty on
the matter, even if the state law is not in direct conflict with foreign treaties, and even if the state law
does not impede federal objectives directly.
Undercurrents of a dormant foreign relations
power first surfaced in 1968 in Zschernig v. Miller.66
In that case, the Court evaluated an Oregon probate statute that allowed foreign nationals to inherit
property in Oregon only if their country of citizenship recognized a reciprocal right for American citizens to inherit property and only if there was proof
that the country of the foreign national would not
confiscate the property in question.67 Even though
the statute did not directly conflict with federal law
or treaties, the Court concluded it was “an intrusion
by the state into the field of foreign affairs which
the Constitution entrusts to the president and the
Congress.”68 It developed a direct effects test which
meant state statutes directly affecting foreign policy
in a negative way would be preempted.69
A 2003 case, American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi,70 is the only other one in which the
Court has expressly relied on the dormant foreign relations power to preempt a
state statute. Garamendi dealt with
a California statute called the Ho- In Garamendi, the
locaust Victim’s Insurance Relief Court relied on the
Act of 1999. The Court found that
dormant foreign
the Constitution forbade California
relations power
from using HVIRA because it comto preempt a state
promised the president’s diplomatic
statute
relations and on this basis struck
down the law. The Court concluded
foreign policy interests outweighed state interests in
the matter of “vindicating victims” of war crimes.71
In Garamendi, the Supreme Court set up a twostep analysis, the first of which determined whether
the state statute in question involved a traditional
state interest. If a state law affecting foreign policy
did not fall under traditional state competence, the
Court suggested the state law should be preempted
whether or not the federal government had already
acted.72 While the Court has yet to employ this
type of preemption, it seems quite similar to that
of the dormant Commerce Clause’s strict scrutiny
standard. If a state law did address a topic of traditional state competence, the Court held that state
laws were to be reviewed under a balancing test. In
such a circumstance, the Court explained that it
would weigh the strength of the foreign policy in-
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terest against the importance of the state concern.73
While this line of case law is far from completely
developed, it appears to work very similarly to the
balancing test used for dormant Commerce Clause
challenges.
To be sure, states are usually not precluded from
acting unless the federal government has directly
spoken to an issue through statute or treaty, or unless the state action would directly conflict with
federal action. But Garamendi illustrates a narrow
exception to that general rule. In cases like Garamendi, state action can be preempted if it interferes
with federal diplomatic efforts. As a result, California, or any other state, should take care when embarking on international agreements.

California’s ability to expand its market to
include offsets outside of the United States

Starting with the premise that states can act as long
as the federal government has not acted, it would
seem that states are not precluded from developing international trading agreements for GHG
emissions. Although the federal government has
expressed various positions on climate change
through a number of different channels, none of
them directly preempts California from incorporating offsets outside of the United States into its state
program.
In 1997, the U.S. Senate approved a resolution
that declared that the United States would not ratify
any international agreement on climate change unless the agreement required adequate emission controls on developing countries and did not cause the
United States economic harm.74 President George
W. Bush has stated that his administration is opposed to the Kyoto Protocol because it does not include major carbon-producing countries, like China.75 These statements demonstrate that the federal
government will not presently act to reduce GHGs
under Kyoto. This does not mean that states are
precluded from acting as a result. President Bush
also has entered into an executive agreement with
Asian nations, called the Asia-Pacific Partnership on
Clean Development and Climate, which focuses on
encouraging the development of new technology
that can reduce GHG emissions.76 The partnership
is the only formal action that deals explicitly with
federal government action on climate change. It is
proper to ask whether this is preemption by an executive agreement. It does not appear that it is. The
partnership does not expressly preempt state law. In
fact, the charter states that the partnership is meant
to complement and not to replace the Kyoto Protocol, and that it will build on other global initiatives. Thus, it seems rather than prohibiting action,

the partnership seeks to encourage other efforts
to reduce GHG emissions.77 Furthermore, given
that the agreement focuses on developing clean
technologies, rather than economic cap-and-trade
programs, a state statute to initiate carbon trading
with the EU is unlikely to directly conflict with or
impede the partnership.
It should be noted that Congress has recently
been considering a number of bills to address climate change and doing so with increasing fervor.78
If any of these bills are ratified, state
cap-and-trade programs might be
If Congress does
more directly preempted. For now,
enact a climate
however, we are operating under the
change law, state
assumption that the federal government has not taken any direct action
cap-and-trade
to establish a cap-and-trade program programs might be
in the United States.
directly preempted
Because state carbon trading
schemes are not explicitly preempted, to the extent that the federal government prohibits California from setting up a trading system
that cooperates with foreign countries, it would
have to be under the narrow exception of Garamendi, or the dormant foreign relations power. In fact,
the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA suggests
that a state’s ability to act on the international stage
in this very context of climate change is limited:
When a state enters the union, it surrenders
certain sovereign prerogatives. Massachusetts
cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions
in greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and
in some circumstances the exercise of its police
powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted.79
The relevant question, then, is whether Garamendi can be distinguished from the case of an
international agreement on GHG emissions reductions between California and the EU. Basically, if
the California Air Resources Board is able to demonstrate how trading regulations do not fall within
the Garamendi exception, those regulations will be
more robust to potential constitutional challenges.
One difference between the insurance laws in
Garamendi, as compared with a GHG trading
market, is that the insurance laws implicated the
president’s wartime power. In other words, when a
state’s law implicates the president’s ability to broker peace, the executive’s dormant foreign relations
power is particularly powerful. In fact, the Court
in Garamendi specifically noted that the executive
would not normally have had as much power to
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regulate claims from private entities, but with regard to wartime claims, the public and the private
sectors become blurred.80 In contrast to the laws at
issue in Garamendi, California’s GHG regulations
avoid compromising the president’s wartime authority.
A cap-and-trade market linking California with
the EU would be aimed at facilitating private voluntary exchanges, not at resolving public international
disputes. It is not as if California would be ratifying a formal policy with the EU on how to address
climate change, but rather it would only serve to
facilitate efficient trading markets. While it is true
that public regulations would need to be in place in
order to ensure an efficient trading scheme, the private market would be controlling the trades, rather
than public negotiations. As a result, international
diplomacy is not at stake in as precarious a way as
it was in Garamendi or as in the illustrative example
of initiating formal talks with China, as the Court
described in Massachusetts v. EPA. It would be important for the California Air Resources Board to
emphasize this distinction in its regulations and
focus on the private rather than public aim of any
negotiations that would include the EU.
Another difference between Garamendi and
emissions trading markets is that emissions trading
fits more easily within a traditional state interest.
In Garamendi, the Court stated that California was
not acting within a traditional state interest by enacting regulations directing insurance companies to
disclose Holocaust-era insurance claims. As compared to the limited aim of redressing Holocaust
victims in Garamendi, a GHG emissions trading
scheme would have much broader
relevance for the entire state.
The record built by
In large part, just as governmenthe state during its tal purpose established in the record
decisionmaking will will control the dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, the record built by
determine how a
the California Air Resources Board
court would view its during its decisionmaking process
interest
will fundamentally determine how a
court would view California’s interest. It is not hard to imagine that in formulating
regulations for a cap-and-trade system, one reason
California might move forward is to make up for
what might be viewed as the failure of the federal
government to take any meaningful international
action on climate change. Indeed, the fact that the
federal government has not entered into the Kyoto
Protocol might have great value as symbolic politics. The more that California articulates an interest in trying to demonstrate the inadequacies of the
federal approach, the more its own characterization
Page 60
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suggests a desire to set up a conflict between federal
policy and state policy — and the closer it gets to
the dormant foreign affairs line.
Particularly problematic would be an effort by
California to try to use its program to somehow
reform the international trading system formed by
Kyoto, perhaps by insisting on some change to its
trading or processes before California would concede to reciprocity of emission credits. If this is the
case, as suggested in Massachusetts v. EPA, California would have very weak footing. The Court has
long recognized a prominent federal interest in foreign commerce, just as it has its interest in interstate
commerce. For example in Japan Line, Ltd. v. City
of Los Angeles,81 the Court struck down a state tax
on Japanese shipping companies, stating, “foreign
commerce is preeminently a matter of national
concern.”82 It would be wise for California to avoid
renegotiating existing Kyoto conditions during any
discussions.
Thus, California would be smart to build a
strong record emphasizing the ways in which the
state would benefit from both its program and its
desire to reduce costs of the program on its regulated community. While the particular method of
establishing an international trading system may be
a novel approach to minimizing the cost of exercising police power, the idea of both seeking efficiency
and attempting to protect and look after its citizens
is a very familiar one for state lawmakers.
The theme California may want to emphasize
is that its trading scheme would increase environmental well-being by encouraging the reduction of
GHGs while saving businesses money by allowing
them to trade carbon credits in a larger market. In
particular, it should make clear that linking state
initiatives to the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme
or other foreign carbon markets has the potential of
making it easier for state businesses to comply with
stringent emission caps because the ETS is such a
large and comprehensive market.83
Both the private nature of emissions trading
regulations that would include Europe and the fact
that such regulations would align with traditional
state interests serve to distinguish Garamendi from
an emissions trading scheme. Yet, it may still be argued that the federal government has a federal interest to speak with one voice in continued negotiations and that if California were to incorporate international cooperation into its trading system, the
United States would have less clout as a hold out.
It could also be argued that establishing a trading
initiative between foreign governments and U.S.
states would interfere with the administration’s
protests against the Kyoto Protocol. The argument
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may go that if Kyoto member nations can deal with
states individually, there is less allure to meet U.S.
demands. This is something that California should
keep in mind as it begins to consider opening discussions with foreign governments. In the end, the
state should proceed gingerly when attempting to
bridge markets. The more that California attempts
to engage in negotiations about economic or political discrepancies between trading systems, the more
likely that it will enter the realm of foreign policy.
While it is uncertain whether it would be possible for California to create an economically advantageous and politically feasible trading system with
foreign governments considering the constitutional
limits inherent, it would be prudent for the California Air Resources Board to include a severability
clause in relation to any regulations linking California with foreign carbon markets. With that added
protection, California could ensure that a cap-andtrade system could still exist within the state even
if it was unable to formally establish a trading relationship with foreign governments.

Conclusion

I

n this promising time for GHG regulation in
California, the state faces some critical choices
about how to structure its cap-and-trade program. Its decisions will create different political
winners and losers and will have distinct implications for the program’s efficiency, equity, and
administrative costs. Among the many factors that
California ought to consider are the constitutional
implications of combating leakage
and extending a trading market into
California faces
international territory.
some critical
The fate of California’s ability to
choices about
control leakage will hinge on whether the state can take actions without
how to structure
triggering strict scrutiny under the
its cap-and-trade
dormant Commerce Clause. Faprogram
cially discriminatory laws, laws with
discriminatory effects or purposes,
or laws that regulate outside a state’s jurisdiction
always face strict scrutiny. When a law is nondiscriminatory and does not reach outside the state’s
jurisdiction, courts are likely to utilize the less stringent Pike balancing test. In large part, Pike requires
courts to weigh the burden a law places on interstate commerce against the purported benefit of the
law.
Because of the subjective nature of this test, the
upshot of judicial review is often difficult to predict. Part of the challenge is that this balancing
test requires the reviewing court to balance incom-

mensurate values. To succeed under the Pike test,
California should find a way to regulate the carbon
content of electricity by focusing entirely on California entities. In doing so, it should ensure that
its regulation does not place an unequal burden on
out-of-staters who are navigating
the regulations in order to achieve
Finding the right
compliance.
balance may
Finding the right balance may
be challenging,
prove challenging. But creating a
program that exceeds constitutional
but exceeding
limits will prove fatal. If California constitutional limits
invests ahead of time in addressing
would be fatal
constitutional concerns, it will not
have to invest after the fact in defending a program that cannot withstand judicial
scrutiny.
International linkages between California’s trading market and the carbon markets of other nations might yield a ground-breaking step toward
an efficient market in GHG emissions trading
throughout the world. But this does not resolve the
constitutional challenges associated with building
this market. Action by California that is directed
toward foreign governments may be preempted
by the dormant foreign relations power under the
Garamendi exception. Of course, Garamendi is a
limited holding, and the facts of Garamendi may
be distinguished from a GHG trading program in
California that would incorporate trading with foreign nations.
As it begins to develop a program to address
GHG emissions, the California Air Resources Board
should attempt to emphasize the differences between Garamendi and any link between California
and foreign nations in order to make a future trading program robust. In particular, the board should
highlight the private, as opposed to public, nature of
a trading market. The board should also develop a
record that demonstrates how GHG trading markets
can be classified as a traditional state interest. Finally,
the board should consider including a severability
clause in its regulations that would allow it to terminate relations with the EU if necessary while keeping
the rest of a trading program intact. Overall, it may
be legally difficult for California to develop relations
with foreign nations in an attempt to combat global
warming and even potentially to enter into the ETS
or other foreign carbon trading markets, but the state
may decide the benefits are worth the effort. If so, as
it moves forward, California should remain aware of
the legal challenges and attempt to avoid interfering
with international negotiations surrounding climate
change reductions. •
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